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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the resilience of network components, and recovery
capabilities of extreme-scale high-performance computing (HPC) systems,
specically petaop-level supercomputers, aimed at solving complex science,
engineering, and business problems that require high bandwidth, enhanced
networking, and high compute capabilities. The resilience of the network is
critical for ensuring successful execution of the applications and overall sys-
tem availability. Failure of interconnect components such as links, routers,
power supply, etc. pose a threat to the resilience of the interconnect net-
work, causing application failures and, in the worst case, system-wide failure.
An extreme-scale system is designed to manage these failures and automati-
cally recover from such failures to ensure successful application execution and
avoid system-wide failure. Thus, in this thesis, we characterize the success
probability of the recovery procedures as well as the impact of the recov-
ery procedures on the applications. We developed an interconnect recovery
mechanisms analysis tool (I-RAT), a plugin built on top of LogDiver [1] to
characterize and assess the impact of recovery mechanisms. The tool was
used to analyze more than two years of network/system logs from Blue Wa-
ters, a supercomputer operated by the NCSA at the University of Illinois.
Our analyses show that recovery mechanisms are frequently triggered (in as
little as 36 hours for link failovers) that can fail with relatively high prob-
ability (as much as 0.25 for link failover). Furthermore, the analyses show
that system resilience does not equate to application resilience since execut-
ing applications can fail with non-negligible probability during (or just after)
a successful recovery. Our analyses show that interconnect recovery mech-
anisms are frequently triggered (the mean time between triggers is as short
as 36 hours for link failovers), and the initiated recovery fails with relatively
high probability (as much as 0.25 for link failover). We also show that as
many as 20% of the executing applications fail during the recovery phase.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
This work was motivated by the failures of the recovery procedures observed
in the high-performance interconnection network during the rst two years
of operational hours of Blue Waters, the 13.1-petaop Cray hybrid super-
computer at the University of Illinois, managed by the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). A high-performance interconnection
network is a key infrastructure providing communication paths for inter-
process communication and le accessibility in a supercomputer. A high-
performance computing (HPC) interconnect must meet the following needs
{ (1) high performance (low latency and high bandwidth to ensure appli-
cation scalability [3, 4]), and (2) resilience (ability to continuously provide
services without disruption in the face of failures via quick recovery and fail-
ure containment [5] ). The research on interconnects has primarily focused
on the performance and reliable delivery of messages/data transmitted over
the network. However, the research on the resiliency of the network in-
frastructure itself, specically building recovery procedures for large-scale
systems is limited to handling one failure at a time disregarding concurrent
failures and other system activities occurring in the system during the recov-
ery time. In the past, the resilience of network infrastructure was improved
through methods such as link redundancy, data protection (checksum, ECC),
rerouting and link retransmission. This approach works well for a relatively
small-scale system as the time to recover/switch to redundant components
is negligible. However, with the growing system scale, the mean time be-
tween failures (MTBF) of components has decreased leading to the increase
in triggers of recovery procedures and the manifestation of complex recovery
scenarios (e.g., concurrent execution of multiple recovery procedures). Such
1
behavior has resulted in new challenges such as 1) the increase in duration
of the recovery (due to increase in convergence time of the routing algorithm
and additional checking to ensure correctness of the system state) and 2)
arbitration and management of concurrently executing recovery procedures
that can interfere with each other. These new challenges limit interconnect
resiliency scaling and potentially can aect the resilience of future extreme-
scale systems [6]. However, to understand the severity of these challenges for
future systems, we need to study and characterize the impact of interconnect
failures and recoveries on system and applications for current systems and
model these failures for future generations of supercomputers. We developed
interconnect recovery mechanisms analysis tool (I-RAT), a plugin built on
top of LogDiver[1] to characterize and assess the impact of recovery mecha-
nisms. The tool was used to analyze more than two years of network/system
logs from Blue Waters a supercomputer operated by NCSA. Our study is
based on mining failure data logs, application logs, and human- written fail-
ure reports collected from Blue Waters over two years, from January 2013 to
March 2015.
1.2 Contribution and Results
Key contributions of this thesis are:
 Development of techniques to extract, track, and cluster recovery proce-
dure events from system logs, and correlate these clusters with applica-
tion logs and manual failure reports. I-RAT extends the LogDiver tool
previously presented in [1, 7], and includes a lter that is able to extract
and decode events generated during Gemini recovery procedures, and a
novel state-aware coalescing algorithm. This algorithm coalesces events
based on: (1) the system hierarchy, a tree-like structure that captures
topological dependencies among system components (e.g., cabinet !
blade ! node/ASIC ! link) and helps track event propagation across
the levels of the system hierarchy; and (2) a state machine, which cap-
tures sequences of activities (or actions) corresponding to recovery pro-
cedures. The coalescing algorithm reconstructs recovery sequences from
ltered events. In addition, the analysis pipeline: (1) determines the
termination status of recovery procedures (successful/fail), (2) matches
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recovery sequences with system-wide outage (SWO) events from failure
reports, and (3) evaluates the impact of recovery procedures and related
SWOs on the applications executed on the compute nodes involved in
the recovery operations.
 Demonstration of the proposed methodology in characterizing the re-
covery procedures of the Gemini interconnect system. Specically, we
provide results on (1) distribution of failures/successes of recovery pro-
cedures caused by lane, link, and warm-swap failures; (2) trends in the
rates of recovery procedure failures; and (3) the impact of interconnect
recovery procedures on applications.
 This thesis provides the following crucial ndings :
1. Showcasing that failure of recovery mechanisms lead to a signif-
icant number of SWOs and application failures. Despite having
various levels of hardware redundancy and error-protection mech-
anisms, Blue Waters suered from 28 SWOs due to interconnect
failures during two years of production. In our study, we found
that interconnect-related problems caused SWOs only once due to
unrouteable topology conguration.
2. Our analyses provide evidence that applications can fail during
successful execution of recovery. Statistically, on Blue Waters
20.13% of applications failed during failed execution of recovery
and 0.20% of the applications failed during successful execution
of recovery.
3. The analyses further show that the mean time between trigger
of recovery events (and hence, MTBF) for interconnect-network
components are either comparable or much lower than that for
other system components such as nodes, memory, etc. For ex-
ample, Martino et al. [8] showed the MTBF of node failures to
be approximately 6.7 hours compared with 2.8 minutes for lane
recovery, 36.2 hours for link recovery, and 20.6 hours for warm
swap. A failure of a node only aects the application running on
the system. However, failure of a link and its recovery aects the
whole system. This is a serious issue for overall reliability of the
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system due to the low success probability associated with the re-
covery of interconnect-network failures. For example, the success
probability of link recovery is only 75.8%.
Our methodology and tools can be used to create models and analyze
logs dierent from Gemini, with a reasonable adaptation eort. This
makes the proposed approach valuable for researchers and practitioners
that aim to generate system-level models to analyze eld data.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the details
of the Blue Waters system. Chapter 3 provides background on interconnects
and a detailed overview of the Gemini interconnect. Chapter 4 denes a list of
technical words used in this thesis. Chapter 5 describes models, methodology,
and tools developed to analyze and understand the impact of recoveries on
applications and systems using eld data. Chapter 6 describes the results
obtained from the analysis of eld data. Chapter 7 describes the related
work. Finally, chapter 8 presents the conclusions drawn from the thesis and
discusses the future directions of this work.
1.4 Related publications
Some of the work presented in this dissertation has previously been published
in various venues. The relevant publications are:
FTXS15 Martino, Catello Di, Saurabh Jha, William Kramer, Zbigniew
Kalbarczyk, and Ravishankar K. Iyer. "Logdiver: a tool for measuring re-
silience of extreme-scale systems and applications." In Proceedings of the 5th
Workshop on Fault Tolerance for HPC at eXtreme Scale, pp. 11-18. ACM,
2015.
CUG16 Jha, Saurabh, Valerio Formicola, Z. Kalbarczyk, C. Di Martino,
William T. Kramer, and Ravishankar K. Iyer. "Analysis of Gemini Intercon-
nect Recovery Mechanisms: Methods and Observations." Cray User Group:
8-12.
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CHAPTER 2
BLUE WATERS SYSTEM DETAILS
In this chapter, we will describe the Blue Waters system architecture, job
submission and scheduling, and error logging details. All our insights and
data are based on the data collected from Blue Waters.
2.1 Blue Waters System Architecture
Blue Waters is a sustained petaop system capable of delivering approx-
imately 13.34 petaops (at peak) for a range of real-world scientic and
engineering applications. The system is equipped with |
 288 Cray liquid-cooled cabinets hosting 26,496 nodes and 1.66 PB of
RAM. Each cabinet consists of an L1 cabinet controller, several fan
trays, power conversion electronics, breakers, a blower and chiller, and
related piping. Each cabinet is organized in 3 chassis, and each chassis
hosts 8 blades
 26,496 compute nodes (based on AMD Opteron processors) with a total
of 362,240 cores
 4,228 GPU hybrid nodes equipped with Nvidia K20X GPU accelerators
and AMD Opteron processors with 33,792 cores
 672 service nodes
 The high-speed Cray Gemini network, to provide node connectivity
 The online storage system, consisting of 198 Cray Sonexion 1600 stor-
age units equipped with 20,196 disks, and 396 SSDs (used to store
le system metadata) that provide access to 26 petabytes (36 raw) of
usable storage over a Lustre distributed le system
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(a) Blue Waters XE Blade (b) Blue Waters XK Blade
Figure 2.1: Blue print of Blue Waters blades
 300 petabytes (380 raw) of usable near-line tape storage.
Compute node hardware Compute nodes are hosted in 5,660 Cray XE6
blades (see Figure 2.1a), 4 nodes per blade. A compute node consists of 2 16-
core AMD Opteron 6276 processors [9] at 2.6 GHz. Each Opteron includes 8
dual-core AMD Bulldozer modules. Each compute node is equipped with 64
GB of DDR3 RAM in 8 GB DIMMs. System memory is protected with x8
Chipkill [9, 10] code. XE node specications are summarized in Table 2.1.
AMD 6276 Interlagos Processors 2
Bulldozer Cores 16
Integer Scheduling Units 32
Memory / Bulldozer Core 4 GB
Total Node Memory 64 GB
Peak Performance 313.6 GF
Memory Bandwidth 102.4 GB/s
Table 2.1: XE Node Specs
GPU node hardware GPU nodes are hosted in 768 Cray XK7 blades, 4
nodes per blade (see Figure 2.1b). A GPU node consists of a 16-cores Opteron
6272 processor equipped with 32 GB of DDR3 RAM in 8 GB DIMMs and a
Nvidia K20X accelerator. The accelerators are equipped with 2,880 single-
precision CUDA cores and 6 GB of DDR5 RAM memory with the latter
protected with ECC. XK node specications are summarized in Table 2.2.
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AMD 6276 Interlagos Processors 1
Bulldozer Cores 8
Integer Scheduling Units 16
Memory / Bulldozer Core 4 GB
Node System Memory 32 GB
GPU Memory 6 GB
Peak CPU Performance 156.8 GF
CPU Memory Bandwidth 51.2 GB/s
CUDA cores 2688
Peak GPU Performance (DP) 1.31 TF
GPU Memory Bandwidth (ECC o)*** 250 GB/s
Table 2.2: XK7 GPU Node Specs
Service node hardware Service nodes are hosted on 166 Cray XIO blades
and 30 XE6 blades, 4 nodes per blade. Each XIO service node consists of a
6-core AMD Opteron 2435 working at 2.3 GHz and equipped with 16 GB of
DDR2 memory in 4 GB DIMMs protected by x4 Chipkill (with single symbol
error correction and dual-symbol error detection capabilities). Service nodes
host special PCI-Express cards such as Inniband and ber-channel cards. A
service node can be congured as 1) a boot node to orchestrate system-wide
reboots, 2) a system database node to collect event logs, 3) a MOM node
for scheduling jobs, 4) a network node to bridge external networks through
Inniband QDR IB cards, or 5) as an Lnet (Lustre lesystem network) node
to handle metadata (via Lustre metadata servers, or MDSes, to keep track of
the location of the les in the storage servers) and le I/O data (via Lustre
Object Storage Servers, or OSSes, to store the data stripes across the storage
modules) for le system servers and clients.
Inteconnect Blue Waters high-speed network consists of a Cray Gemini
System Interconnect. A detailed description of the interconnect is given in
chapter 3.
File System. All blades are diskless and use the shared parallel le system
for IO operations. Blue Waters hosts the largest Lustre installation to date.
It consists of parallel le system used to manage data stored in Cray Sonexion
1600 [11] storage modules. Each Sonexion module has 1) 2 SSD of 2 TB in
a RAID 1 conguration for journaling and logging, 2) 22 disks of 2 TB
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for metadata storage, and 3) 80 disks of 2 TB for data storage, organized
in units of 8 disks in RAID 6. All disks are connected to two redundant
RAID controllers. In each unit, two additional disks serve as hot spares,
which automatically provide failover for a failed drive. Data are accessed
transparently from the nodes via the Lustre service nodes (Lnet), which
interface with the Sonexion storage modules. Blue Waters includes three le
systems, i.e., project, scratch, and home, and provides up to 26 PB of usable
storage over 36 PB of raw disk space.
Running Jobs on Blue Waters Blue Waters users can submit their jobs
using aprun command which submits the job to Application Level Placement
Scheduler (ALPS) [12]. ALPS then launches applications on compute nodes.
For submitting batch jobs or interactive jobs, users can use qsub command.
Blue Waters is congured to use Moab/Torque [13] for launching batch jobs.
Figure 2.2 shows the transition of job state from its start to end. For each
of these states, Torque writes an event message in the torque logs which can
then be used to track the status of the job in the system. In [14, 15] studied
the job exit status for Blue Waters system.
UNSUBMITTED PENDING
RUNNING
DEAD
SUBMIT
Schedule
FAIL, KILL, LOST
EVICT, FAIL, FINISH, KILL, LOST
SUBMIT
Figure 2.2: State transition diagram of the job from start to end.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERCONNECTS
In this chapter, we will rst briey give an overview of interconnects and
dive deeper into the details of torus networks. Then, we will describe the ar-
chitecture and system design of the Cray Gemini interconnects. Blue Waters
uses the Cray Gemini interconnect, which is a torus network.
3.1 Interconnection Networks
An interconnection network is a programmable system that transports data
between terminals. The main design aspects of interconnection networks are
(1) topology, (2) routing, (3) ow control, and (4) recovery. Topology deter-
mines the connection between compute nodes and network nodes (routers,
switches, etc.). Routing, ow control, and recovery heavily depend on the
topology of the interconnection system. The most widely used topologies in
high-performance computing (HPC) are (1) fat tree (e.g. Roadrunner HPC
system [16]), (2) dragony (e.g., Trinity [17]), and (3) torus (e.g., Blue Wa-
ters [18]). At the time of writing of this thesis, 40% of top 10 HPC systems
are using torus, another 40% dragony and 20% use fat-tree topologies in
their interconnect technologies. Fig. 5.4 shows the arrangement of nodes in
these three topologies.
3.1.1 Torus Networks
Torus networks can support N = kn nodes which are arranged in a k-ary
n-cube grid (i.e., nodes are arranged in regular n-dimensional grid with k
nodes in each dimension). In the case of Blue Waters, n = 3. In torus
networks, each node serves simultaneously as an input terminal, output ter-
minal and switching node of the network. Torus networks are regular (i.e.,
9
(a) Binary 4-tree fat tree Topology
(b) 2-D Torus Topology (c) 1,4,1 Dragon y Topology
Figure 3.1: Interconnect Topologies (a) Binary 4-tree fat tree Topology, (b)
2-D Torus Topology, (c) 1,4,1 Dragon y Topology - arrangement of
network nodes (shown as boxes) and compute nodes (shown as circles)
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all nodes have the same degree) and are also edge-symmetric (useful for load-
balancing). Torus networks are very popular for exploiting physical locality
between communicating nodes, providing low latency and high throughput.
However, the average hop count to route packets to a random node is high
compared with that of logarithmic networks. On the other hand, extra hop
counts provide path diversity, which is required for building fault-tolerant
architecture.
Path diversity is given by the total number of minimum routes from a to
b that are possible in a topology. For a torus network, it is given by equation
3.1
jRabj =
(
n 1P
i=0
i)!
n 1Q
i=0
i!
(3.1)
where i is the number of hops between the ith dimension of a and b. The
number of unique paths increases rapidly with dimension and distance. This
makes interconnects more tolerant to single failures. However, situations
exist in which the topology becomes unrouteable due to multiple failures.
Unrouteable topology congurations can be enumerated for any given n and
k.
Maximum throughput in a torus network [19, 20] is achieved when
equation 3.2 is satised -
nk  N Wn
Ws
(3.2)
where Wn is the channel width limit (highest attainable frequency on the
channel) due to node pin-out (which determines the the ability to send bits
in parallel) and Ws is the channel width limit due to bisection (highest at-
tainable frequency on the channel across the bisection).
Latency in a network is a function of serialization latency and hop count.
Serialization latency is the time required for a packet of length L to cross
a channel with bandwidth b. On the other hand minimum hop count in a
torus network is determined by equation 3.3.
Hmin;T =
8<:nk4 ; if k evenn(k
4
  1
4k
); if k odd
(3.3)
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Routing involves selection of the path from the source node (src) to des-
tination node (dst) among many possible paths in a given topology. In torus
networks, routing is done through the dimensional-order routing algorithm.
In dimensional-order routing, each packet travels in the network by resolving
each dimension one at a time. Once the algorithm resolves a dimension, it
does not account for the solution to reenter the resolved dimensions. For ex-
ample, in a 3-D torus, the router rst resolves the X dimension, then the Y
dimension, and nally the Z dimension. Note that packets in torus networks
can travel in a clockwise or counterclockwise direction. Thus, the rst step
in routing is to determine the direction of routing. Routing direction can be
determined by equation 3.4.
Di =
8<:0; if jij = k=2sign(i); otherwise (3.4)
where i is given by
i = mi  
8<:0; if mi  k2k; otherwise (3.5)
and mi is given by
mi = (dsti   srci) mod k (3.6)
3.1.2 Errors, Failures, and Recovery
The rst step in building a resilient network is to identify the nature and
types of errors and failures and then build abstract models that can help to
understand and prevent errors and failures. In [2], Dally and Towels have
summarized the existing failure modes. We adapt their table in Table 3.1
and give a brief summary of these failure modes. We advise readers to read
chapter 21 from "Principles and Practices of Interconnection Networks" [2].
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Failure Modes Fault Model
Gaussian noise on a channel Transient bit error
Alpha-particle strikes on memory (per chip) Soft error
Alpha-particle strikes on logic (per chip) Transient bit error
Electomigration of a conductor Stuck-at fault
Threshold shift of a device Stuck-at fault
Connector corrosion open Stuck-at fault
Cold solder joint Stuck-at fault
Power supply failure Fail-stop
Operator removes good modules Fail-stop
Software failures Fail-stop or Byzantine
Table 3.1: Failure modes for a typical interconnection network (adapted
from [2])
Transient failures cause one or more bits to ip, causing temporary er-
rors. These can be easily detected and corrected using checksums and error-
correcting codes (ECCs) or a retry. Transient errors are typically harmless,
and the problem dies on its own over time. An example of transient errors
includes Gaussian noise on the channel and alpha-particle strikes on logic
gates. Transient errors are measured in bit-error rate (BER). Soft errors, on
the other hand, change the values of data, which continue to aect the system
for a long period, thus have a lasting eect. An example of such a case includes
alpha-particle strikes on memory, such as routing tables. These errors are
handled by using memory scrubbers, or simple reboots can be detected using
ECCs. Soft errors are measured by soft-error rate (or SER). The stuck-at
fault permanently damages the component where the logic is either always
high or low. Fail-stop failures are permanent failures in the interconnection
system, such as link failures, router failures, etc. These failures are measured
in mean time between failures (MTBF) or failures in time (FIT).
It is surprising that models do not exist for failure modes of recovery
mechanisms for interconnection networks and the behavior of the system
during the execution of these recovery mechanisms.
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3.1.3 Unrouteable Topology Congurations
Depending on the state of the system and manual recovery/replacement
strategy of failed components, a series of failures can lead to an unrouteable
topology conguration. An ideal interconnect-recovery mechanism would fail
only when it encounters the case of unrouteable topology congurations. An
unrouteable conguration can be dened as a state under which the packets
cannot be routed from source node (src) to destination node (dst) using the
specied routing rules. In Fig. 3.2, we show such a conguration for a 2-D
torus. The failure of two network nodes (indicated in red) blocks all trac
to the network node (indicated in blue) that tries to send packets using the
loop in the Y direction on which the network node is located. For example,
in this conguration packets from node (0,1) cannot be sent to node (1,2).
Figure 3.2: Unrouteable topology conguration for 2-D torus. Red boxes
are the failed network nodes and disabling the blue-colored network node
will restore the connectivity of the network
3.1.4 Cray Gemini Architecture
To keep the section description comprehensive, we have combined some of
the exploratory results gained from the analysis of eld data, with the infor-
mation contained in Cray ocial documentation on the Gemini interconnect
resiliency mechanisms [21]. An overview of the Gemini interconnect is pro-
vided in [22]. Evolution of interconnect technologies for Cray systems can be
tracked using [23, 24, 25] The Blue Waters' high-speed network consists of an
anisotropic 3-D torus using Cray Gemini router (see Figure 3.3) to connect
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Figure 3.3: Blue Waters 3-D Torus Gemini interconnect layout. XE and
XK are CPU and GPU nodes respectively where as LNET is Lustre
NETwork routers running on top of the Gemini interconnect
all the nodes in the system. Each blade includes two Gemini application
specic integrated circuits (ASICs), each housing two network interface con-
trollers (NICs) and a 48-port router. A NIC is attached to one node using a
HyperTransportTM3 host interface. Each ASIC is connected to the network
by means of 10 torus connections, two each in X+, X-, Z+, Z- and one each
in Y+ and Y-. An ASIC also connects internally two nodes using NICs.
Each connection is composed of four links and each link is composed of 3
single-bit bidirectional lanes. Thus, each connection consists of 12 lanes, and
an ASIC connects to the other ASICs on the network via 24 lanes in the
X/Z and 12 in the Y dimension. A channel is a logical connection between
two link end-points. Further, each channel comprises two virtual channels
to prevent request-response dependency cycle. A multidimensional torus in-
terconnect is susceptible to deadlocks due to possible: (1) dimensional turn
dependency cycles, (2) torus dependency cycles, and (3) request/response
dependency cycles. To avoid these dependencies, the Gemini interconnect
system uses packet adaptive virtual cut-through directional ordering routing
algorithm. In Gemini, each channel supports two virtual channels (VC0 and
VC1). However, in order to avoid both request-response and torus depen-
dency cycle, each channel would need four virtual channels. To address this,
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Gemini router chips are divided into two groups (CG0 and CG1). These
two groups along with two available virtual channels make up for the need
for four virtual channels required to avoid request-response dependency cycle
(via VC0 and VC1) and torus dependency cycles (via CG0 and CG1).
3.1.5 Fault Tolerance and Resiliency in Gemini
Gemini provides several levels of protection from errors and failures. Packets
are protected through 16 bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and are checked
at each Gemini ASIC (and between the transition from NIC to router as well).
Gemini ensures reliable delivery of packets using sliding window protocol.
Most of the memory regions are protected via single error correction double
error detection (SEC-DED); however, the buer storing the router tables are
not protected by an error-correcting code.
In terms of path availability for successful delivery of packets, there are
two redundant connections between any two Gemini ASICs in the X and Z
directions whereas only one connection connecting Gemini ASICs in the Y
direction. Each of these connections has two redundant links, and each link
has three redundant lanes. Gemini interconnect is capable of running in de-
graded mode as long as there is at least one active link with a minimum of one
lane functioning properly. In the general literature, software and hardware
designers have used links and channels interchangeably for dierent purposes
with signicant dierences in meaning. For the purpose of consistency and
readability with respect to Cray system logs, we refer to a channel as a logi-
cal connection between link end points, and, therefore, use channel and link
interchangeably. Thus, in this work, a link down does not necessarily mean
that there is no active communication path between two ASICs.
3.1.6 Fault Detection and Recovery in Gemini
Fault detection and recovery of the network is managed through the super-
visor block that connects Gemini to an embedded control processor (L0) on
the blade. The L0 is connected to system management workstation (SMW)
through the Cray Hardware Supervisory System (HSS) network. This is
shown in a block diagram in Figure 3.3. The L0 blade controller detects
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failed links and power loss to Gemini mezzanine cards (mezzanine is a board
on which two ASICs are situated) using the \gmnwd" daemon. System
responses to failures are logged (via the \xthwerrlogd" daemon) and orches-
trated (via the \xtnlrd" daemon) by the SMW. In this work, we study three
specic recovery mechanisms: (1) lane recovery (2) link failover, and (3)
warm swap.
Lane Recovery
The availability of 3 lanes in each link allows the network to tolerate up to
two lane failures and operate in a degraded mode. When all the three lanes
fail in a link, the link is marked as inactive and a link failover is triggered.
Each time a lane goes down, an error is written in the logs and a lane recovery
is triggered by the L0. The controller attempts to recover the lane a certain
number of times (as congured by the system administrator) before marking
the lane as a permanent failed. No lane recovery is triggered for an inactive
link.
A state-transition diagram for the lane recovery is depicted in Figure 3.4.
The two outgoing transitions form the \All Lanes Healthy" state report a
lane failure (one or two lanes unavailable) or the whole link failure (three
lanes unavailable). Lane mask represents a three-digit bitmap (0 indicates a
lane down; 1 indicates a lane healthy). A lane mask 7 means that the lane
recovery is successful. Any other values indicate the position of active lanes
in a bit mask (e.g., a lane mask of 5 means lanes 1 and 3 are active, whereas
lane 2 is inactive).
Link Failover
Figure 3.5 shows the state-transition diagram for the link failover and warm
swap operation of the Gemini interconnect. The failover procedure consists of
(1) waiting 10 seconds to aggregate failures, (2) determining which blade(s)
is/are alive, (3) quiescing the Gemini network trac, (4) asserting a new
route in the Gemini chips (performed by the SMW), and (5) cleaning up and
resuming Gemini. The total time to execute the procedure varies from  30
to  1000 seconds. Links can become unavailable due to one of the following
reasons:
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Figure 3.4: State transition diagram for lane recovery procedure. 3 lane
failures (in the same link) result in an inactive link.
 All three lanes failed in the link
 Power loss in a mezzanine, blade, or cabinet
 Faulty cable
 Other reasons such as routing table corruption, software deadlocks, etc.
A faulty cable causes 32 link endpoints to become unavailable. Power loss
on a mezzanine, blade, and cabinet causes 32, 32, and 960 end points to fail,
respectively. Link failover is triggered whenever a link becomes unavailable.
The link failover operation masks failed links whenever possible without caus-
ing interruption of the network. However, when there is a complete disruption
between the communication of two ASICs or a node/blade/cabinet becomes
unavailable, the failover mechanism has to quiesce the whole network to in-
stall the routes safely. A successful failover restores the communication path
in the network and the functioning of the system, whereas a failed failover
causes the whole network to completely fail, and leads to system-wide out-
age. In Figure 5.3, a state-transition diagram shows the various steps and
conditions leading to a successful or failed link failover. Appendix B shows
a real trace of successful and failed link failover scenario obtained from Blue
Waters.
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Figure 3.5: State transition diagram of Gemini link failover operations.
Warm swap
Warm swap is the addition or removal (disabling) of compute blade/cabinet
in a running system. This operation cannot be performed on service blade/-
cabinets. A warm swap is invoked by human administrators by logging into
the SMW and calling warm swap procedures; hence this procedure is highly
controlled. Warm swap procedure is similar to link failover mechanism with
certain exceptions. Details are shown in the state-transition diagram for
warm swap in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: State transition diagram of Gemini warm swap operation
(which is always invoked by a system administrator).
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CHAPTER 4
DEFINITIONS
In this chapter, we have dened the terms used in this thesis.
Availability | Availability is the ratio of time a system or component is
functional to the total time it is required or expected to function.
Bisection bandwidth| It is the highest bandwidth that can be achieved
across the smallest cut that divides network into two equal halves (parti-
tions).
Fault | Fault is the hypothesized cause of error(s).
Dependability | Dependability is the ability of a system to deliver a
specied service.
Error | Error is the observed incorrect result of an operation after the
computation is nished.
MTBF | MTBF is dened as mean time between failures. MTBF of
event X is given by :
MTBF(X) =
Total Production Hours
Total # Recovery Event X of type Y
(4.1)
MNBR | MNBR is dened as mean node-hours between recovery op-
erations. MNBR of event X of type Y for a xed time period is dened
as:
MNBR(X,Y) =
Total Production Hours
Total # Recovery Event X of type Y
(4.2)
Where, the total number of production node hours is calculated as total
system availability hours (i.e., hours the system is available) * total number
of available nodes, X is the event and Y is the event type. For, example X
can be one of success, failed, or total recovery procedures and Y can be one
of lane, link, warm swap.
Failure| Failure is an event that transitions the state of the system from
good (healthy) to bad (unhealthy).
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Failover | Failover is a method of switching to a standby or redundant
component when the primary fails.
Interconnect | An interconnect is a programmable network that pro-
vides communication paths and protocols for interaction between terminals.
Recovery | Recovery is a method of restoring the system operation(s)
(i.e. returning to desired functionality). Note that the system-state may
change during recovery, however, the system is able to produce outputs when
presented with a valid input after recovery.
Recovery Procedure | A recovery procedure consists of an isolated
recovery operation.
Recovery Process | A recovery process is a combination of recovery
procedures and represents either concurrent or sequential execution of mul-
tiple recovery procedures (e.g., multiple failover operations to recover the
system).
Reliability | Reliability is dened as the probability that a device will
perform its required function under stated conditions for a specic period of
time.
Resiliency | Resilience is the ability to provide and maintain an accept-
able level of service in the face of faults and challenges to normal operation
System-wide Outage | In scientic literature, system-wide outage is
a loosely dened term and is site-specic. In the context of NCSA/Blue
Waters, it is used to declare situations in which the system is not able to
perform as expected.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS
5.1 Approach
To understand and analyze the recovery procedures of the Gemini intercon-
nect, we augmented LogDiver[1], a tool for measuring application resiliency
in HPC systems, with additional capabilities to implement an interconnect-
recovery analysis workow. Interconnect-recovery analysis workow tool (I-
RAT) in that sense is a plugin built on top of LogDiver.
I-RAT lters, coalesces, and correlates Gemini-related errors with applica-
tion failures, and human-written system failure reports managed by system
administrators. I-RAT uses a state-machine model to determine the recovery
type | lane recovery, link failover, warm swap category- and recovery exit
status as successful or failed from logs.
In addition to the characterization of the recovery procedures, I-RAT is
used to evaluate the impact of recovery (successful/failed) on user applica-
tions and the system availability by using LogDiver utilities.
We briey summarize the steps of our approach here before diving deeper
into the details. These steps are |
 Data collection and ltering| In this step, we created a set of rules
that can be used to extract interconnect-specic event logs. Raw logs
from Blue Waters do not directly indicate the source of these logs and
relationship between these logs, thus making it most time-consuming
step. We used a series of strategies to learn about these rules such as
reading the technical manuals from Cray describing the logging mech-
anism, interaction with Blue Waters system admins/Cray engineers,
automatic discovery, and extraction of interconnect-related logs dur-
ing interconnect-related failures found in system-wide outage reports.
The relevant event logs are shown in Table A.1 and the relationship
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between these logs is described in section 3.1.6. The lters obtained
at the end of this step are used in ltering stage of LogDiver in addi-
tion to the lters that were used for extracting application event logs
(described later in this section). Other datasets (see 5.1) used in this
study were readily available from Blue Waters. The formats of these
logs are described in section 5.2.
 Clustering/coalescing the event logs | In this step, we cluster
the interconnect-related events according to the failure recovery model
described in this section. This is a clear addition to LogDiver and forms
the core part of I-RAT. Dierently from LogDiver clustering algorithm
which tries to cluster system errors to nd the cause of application fail-
ures, I-RAT traces the failure-recovery path to understand the cause of
the failure of the recovery as well as the conditions that triggered those
failures in the rst place. This required building a custom coalescing
engine which could cluster the events to enable this study.
 Analyzing the impact on application and system| In this step,
we take the output of LogDiver application parser and correlate the
application failures with the recovery-sequence clusters obtained in the
previous step. In addition, we correlate the failure reports maintained
by the system admins of Blue Waters to correlate the system-wide
outages to recovery clusters. Currently, I-RAT/LogDiver produces the
following output for studying interconnect-related recovery mechanisms
|
{ Recovery-sequence clusters and the nal state of the recovery
{ Number of applications impacted by the recovery and a boolean
variable indicating if it caused SWO or executed during recovery.
{ Measure of mean-time between recovery, mean-time between fail-
ures, etc.
5.2 Data Sources
Our tool takes three inputs (see Table 5.1): (1) syslogs, (2) consolidated
application workload (obtained from ALPS and Torque logs), and (3) manual
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failure reports (created by administrators). The consolidated application
workload logs are ltered so as to contain only user applications (i.e., all
debug and benchmark jobs run by system administrators are removed from
this analysis).
Table 5.1: Summary of data sources
Data time span: January 2013-March 2015
Datasource Count Dataset Size
Raw syslogs* 75,760,682,632 13 TB
Manual failure reports 4,184 1.4 MB
Coalesced Workload 20,600,030 8 GB
5.3 Measuring Application Resiliency : LogDiver
DiMartino et. al. implemented LogDiver to measure the resiliency of appli-
cations in HPC systems. LogDiver produces measurements for 1) measuring
resiliency of dierent application scales, from single node application up to
full-scale applications, and 2) analyzing the sensitivity of applications to dif-
ferent errors. In [15], authors measured the resiliency of the application for
5 million application runs to system and application errors. In [1], authors
discussed the general architecture of LogDiver and further showed the re-
siliency of application to GPU errors on XK nodes of Blue Waters. We
briey describe the general architecture of LogDiver here to help understand
the interaction of I-RAT with LogDiver.
LogDiver operates in four main steps, depicted in Fig. 5.1. Each step
produces several output les that are fed downstream to the subsequent
steps.
 Data Collection| In this step, data is collected from multiple sources
such as syslogs, torque logs, and alps logs. To ease the porting of this
tool to dierent systems, data are parsed to an internal format that is
system-agnostic.
 Parsing and Filtering Data | In this step, syslogs are parsed
through lters (that were created manually) to convert the raw logs
to events using standard error templates. The error template consists
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of specic unique numerical template ID, tag, category, and group to
each error template. The tag is a textual description of the event of
interest (e.g., GPU DOUBLE BIT EXCEPTION or LUSTRE CLIENT
EVICT), the category refers to the subsystem generating the event (i.e.,
NVIDIA GPU or LUSTRE), and the group corresponds to the type of
the subsystem involved in the event (e.g., NODE HW or STORAGE).
At the time of writing this thesis, LogDiver has over 700 error tem-
plates.
 Workload Consolidation | The required application data (i.e., ex-
ecuted aprun commands, see Figure 1) are scattered over several non-
consecutive entries in the ALPS logs and need to be retrieved and
assembled for each user application. The output of the step is an ex-
tended data set of user applications (referred to as application data in
Figure 3.(c)), which contains one entry for each application. The entry
includes i) start and end time, ii) reservation ID, job ID, user, group,
and application name, iii) resources data, e.g., number, ID, and type
of nodes, memory, and virtual memory, iv) application exit code and
job exit code, v) job- and application-required wall time and used wall
time, and vi) the command used to launch the application.
 Workload-Error Matching| In this step, error data is merged with
the workload data generated in the previous step. Error data is rst
coalesced using a sliding window algorithm as described in [26, 27] to
approximate the ground truth occurrence of events.
 Metric Estimation | LogDiver estimates various metrics of interest
with respect to applications that fail because of system related issues.
Metrics used in this study include:
{ Mean Node Hours Between Failures (MNBF) computed as a ratio
of the total number of production node hours to the total number
of application failures
{ Mean Time Between Interrupt (MTBI) computed as a ratio of the
total number of production hours to the total number of applica-
tion failures
{ Probability of an application failure
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Figure 5.1: LogDiver : An HPC log data analysis toolkit
5.4 Interconnect Recovery Analysis Workow Tool :
I-RAT
Figure 5.2 shows the block diagram of the I-RAT plugin built on top of Log-
Diver. I-RAT consists of six operations, indicated by diamond shapes (in
Figure. 5.2): Filter Gemini logs, Gemini aware coalescing, Job impact ana-
lyzer, and System impact analyzer. In order to support I-RAT on LogDiver,
some of the steps of LogDiver was modied. These steps are indicated as
Modied in 5.2. Plugin was developed in C++14.
In the following, we describe all the operations of the I-RAR in detail, that
have been added to LogDiver.
5.4.1 Filter Gemini Logs
Date ltering and tagging operation from LogDiver applies regular expression
(regex) rules onto the raw system logs line by line to extract interconnect-
related logs from syslogs. We added over 100 regex rules to the existing
LogDiver database for extracting interconnect-related events. These regex
rules were selected based on our understanding of Gemini recovery proce-
dures, as discussed in section 3.1.4 and each event is matched to only one
rule. All these rules are listed in Appendix A. These extracted logs are
then ltered and transformed into a set of features, represented by nple
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Figure 5.2: Block diagram of the pipeline for analyzing Gemini recovery
procedures (I-RAT) built on top of LogDiver.
< Time; Location; Tag; Info >. The Time eld is the timestamp of the
logged event; Location is the component that either suered from errors/-
failures, or where the recovery procedure was running; Tag is an identier of
the matched regex rule; Info is used for storing other important information,
such as completion time or error exit reason. Location of the log message,
is determined either through the location eld in the logging protocol [28]
or from the Tag and the body of the message itself. It is important to ex-
tract the exact location to evaluate the impact. For this reason, we modied
the LogDiver data ltering and tagging operation. As an example, below we
show a message taken from syslog, which is written by the xtlnlrd daemon
on the SMW, upon a failure of a Gemini ASIC module.
1368343836 local3 5 2013-05-12T02:30:36.909109-05:00 smw xtnlrd 15324
p0-20130503t234552 [hss nlrd@34] 2013-05-12 02:30:36 smw 15325
cb hw error: failed component c17-10c1s6g1, type 21, error code 0x0d10,
error category 0x0002
Table 5.2: An example log from Blue Waters indicating Gemini ASIC
failure.
In the log example shown in Table 5.2, lter operation determined the
< Time > as the unix time - \1368343836", < Location > as \c17-10c1s6g1",
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which is the failed component, < TAG > as \ASIC FAILED", and < Info >
as \ error code=0x0d10". In this case, the identication label of the failed
component is "c17-10c1s6g1", and contains the < Location > of the Gemini
ASIC failure event, which is not directly indicated in the syslog header. How-
ever, this is more of an exception as in many cases the reporting component
can directly be used as < Location >.
Tag ID Regex Expression Tag
2020
Link recovery operation
was successful
LINK RECOVERY SUCCESS
Table 5.3: An example line from rules database
An example line from our rules database is shown in Table 5.3. These tags
are divided into 4 categories: faults/errors, failures, recovery transition, and
recovery nish. Table 5.4 gives representative examples of tags for each of the
four broader categories. These four tag categories are created based on the
general understanding of the failure manifestation and propagation (as shown
in Fig. 5.3) in the system. The problem starts with faults, which manifest as
an error in the system. Errors lead to failure(s) either immediately or some
time later. A failure invokes a recovery mechanism, which can either succeed
or fail. The details of these categories are as follows |
 Faults/errors |These tags represent errors which can lead to failure or
are indicative of failures that have not been detected yet. Since these
tags do not cause immediate failure of the link/lane, they do not trig-
ger any recovery procedures. However, some of these events result in
disabling of lanes/links, which in turn generates new events (belonging
to Failure category). For example, when a single lane has more er-
rors than its companion lanes, it is deactivated leading to `Lane Down
'event in the system. We refer to these errors as trigger latent as these
events are indicative of interconnect-component failures. For examples,
an increased number of misrouted packet can indicate routing issues.
Similarly, increased number of one lane down event can indicate link
issues and may lead to failure of the link itself.
 Failures|These tags indicate activity in the system that modies or af-
fects the network topology directly, i.e., link addition, link disable, link
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unavailability, thus causing the invocation of recovery procedures to
handle these changes. For example, \ASIC FAILED" indicates a fail-
ure of Gemini ASIC on a blade, causing the links to be unavailable and
making the network unrouteable. In almost all cases, when events from
this category are observed, recovery procedures are expected to han-
dle these events. Since these events trigger immediate recovery action
in the system to restore the topology and functioning of interconnect,
these events are also called as trigger-immediate.
 Recovery start and transition steps |These tags indicate the starting
point and the intermediate steps of the recovery procedures, and, hence
help to keep track of the system actions taken for failure mitigation.
Also, this data helps to understand if any other failures in the system
interfere with the recovery procedure. For example, \LINK AGG -
FAILURES" tag indicates that the recovery procedure is waiting and
collecting any additional failures for T seconds before calculating new
routes for the network.
 Recovery nal |These tags include all the states that indicate the
nal state (success/fail/missing) of the recovery procedure. For ex-
ample, \LINK FAILOVER SUCCESS" indicates that the link failover
operation nished successfully.
Fault/Error
(Trigger 
Latent)
Failure 
(Trigger
Immediate)
Transition 
Step
SuccessfulFailed Missing
Failover/Recovery Finish
Failover/ 
Recovery  
Start
Figure 5.3: Reduced recovery-sequence state-transition diagram. All
state-transition diagrams described in Section 3.1.4 are mapped to this
reduced state-transition diagram.
29
FAULTS/ERRORS RECOVERY START & TRANSITION
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LINK INACTIVE 4.39E+05 LINK AGG FAILURES 4.24E+02
ONE LANE DOWN 3.50E+07 NETWORK QUISCE 9.19E+02
RX VC DESC INV 7.22E+05 NETWORK UNQUISCE 9.15E+02
SSID UNEXPECTEDR-
SPSSID
2.14E+05 REROUTE SUCCESS 1.68E+03
TWO LANE DOWN 5.69E+05 ROUTE COMPUTE 1.05E+03
ROUTING RETRY 1.09E+02
FAILURES STARTED LINK RECOV-
ERY
2.51E+05
ASIC FAILED 1.85E+04 WARM SWAP FINISH TIME 7.02E+02
BLADE DOWN DETECTED 3.73E+02 WARM SWAP STARTED 7.04E+02
EPO FAULT 1.60E+03 RECOVERY FINISH
FAN FAULT 1.27E+03 LINK RECOVERY FAILED 9.60E+01
LINK FAILED 2.51E+05 LANE RECOVERY FAILED 2.85E+03
MEZZANINE POWER -
FAILED
5.18E+04 LINK RECOVERY FAILED 9.60E+01
NODE DOWN 1.95E+06 LINK RECOVERY SUC-
CESS
3.22E+02
ROUTING TABLE COR-
RUPTION
1.17E+02 WARM SWAP DELAYED 4.00E+00
THREE LANE DOWN 5.76E+05 WARM SWAP FAILED 5.10E+01
NODE UP 3.93E+05 WARM SWAP SUCCESS 6.51E+02
Table 5.4: Tag categories with representative tag examples and related
counts, as observed in the logs
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In a complex system like Blue Waters, it is hard to build (and then track)
deterministic model of the state transitions (described in section 3.1.4) during
recovery due to the following reasons |
 Failure during recovery procedure: A failure during a recovery proce-
dure can alter the state, and, hence the state transition of the recovery
path, depending on the type of failure. This failure acts as interfer-
ence, and thus, alters the normal recovery path. It is impossible to
know all the transition paths in advance due to - (1) unavailability of
the underlying code, and (2) non-determinism in the system.
 Issue of bias versus variance in modelling : Explicitly coding all the
recovery paths into the model increases the model complexity, and
hence, can lead to a high bias in the model. This hinders the discovery
of true causes of the failures.
 Logging issues : The timestamps stored in the logs represent the logging
time of an event. Sometimes, there can be incoherency in the logging as
the dierent events are logged by dierent subsystems, and writes (to
the log le) may not follow a strict order. An event can be completely
missed when the system is heavily stressed, e.g., the logging service
itself is down, the memory is corrupted, or the network is unavailable.
To cope with these problems and represent all recovery procedures using a
general model (i.e. a common state-transition diagram) of failure manifesta-
tion and propagation in the system, the state-transition diagrams described
in section 3.1.4 are mapped injectively onto a reduced state-transition dia-
gram depicted in Figure 5.3. This abstraction does not only help us cope with
the problems discussed above, but also reduces the time to do our analysis
as there are many fewer states to track.
5.4.2 Gemini Aware Coalescing
The coalescing algorithm is executed on the output of Filter. The algorithm
shown in Algorithm 1 creates clusters of events (corresponding to messages
logged) to form Gemini recovery-sequences. The algorithm coalesces tags
based on the xed sliding window algorithm proposed in [29, 30]. The algo-
rithm starts by initializing an empty tree. The tree is essentially based on a
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fault tree model (see Figure 5.4), which captures the topology of the system
and. Hence, potential error propagation paths in the Gemini interconnect.
The idea of using this model lies in the fact that an event at a higher level in
the topology aects all the sub-levels, and hence, all events that occurred in
the lower levels during the same time window (as the high-level event) need
to be merged. Similarly, an event at a lower level can only aect components
located at a higher level in this tree. In this way, the fault tree model ef-
fectively captures Gemini recovery events, as well as it provides an eective
way to index the clusters (generated by the coalescing algorithm) and com-
ponents of the system. Such indexing speeds up the processing time, by at
least an order of magnitude.
SYSTEM
CABINET
BLADE
CABINET
BLADE BLADE BLADE
ASIC/
NODE
ASIC/
NODE
ASIC/
NODE
ASIC/
NODE
LINK LINK LINK LINK
Figure 5.4: Gemini topology-aware fault model. The model helps track the
eects of events in sub-components.
The algorithm rst tries to nd the index where log line (refer to Algo-
rithm 1) can be inserted in the cluster tree. If no index is found, a new leaf
is created at the appropriate level by traversing the tree. If the log line is
inserted at a level that has a sub-tree, all the clusters in the sub-tree are
merged with the cluster of the current level, as required by our fault tree
model described earlier. For example, if the log line belongs to the blade-4
level, all the clusters (if any) below this level are merged with this cluster.
When the cluster is complete, the nal state of the sequence is decided using
the state-transition diagram shown in Figure 5.3. The algorithmic complex-
ity of the outlined model is O(n log(m)), where n is the number of lines and
m is the system size determined by the total number of unique components
(e.g., links, ASICs, blades, cabinets, etc.).
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Algorithm 1 Coalescence of Gemini recovery procedures related events.
1: Tree = initialize cluster tree()
2: for log line in ltered logs do
3: current cluster = find cluster index(Tree; log line:location)
4: if ((current cluster:timestamp  log line:timestamp)  slide time)
&& (current cluster 6= NULL) then
5: current cluster:timestamp = log line:timestamp
6: current cluster:add(log line)
7: merge all clustrs in subtree(current cluster)
8: current cluster:transitions:add(determine cluster states(current cluster)
9: else
10: if (current cluster 6= NULL) then
11: current cluster:final state =
determine cluster states(current cluster)
12: write(current cluster)
13: end if
14: start new cluster(Tree; log line:location)
. Start new cluster with log line being it's rst member at the
appropriate location in tree
15: end if
16: end for
17: write active clusters(Tree) . Write all active clusters
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Table 5.5: Example of Recovery Sequence Cluster(Output of Coalescing
Algorithm )
Start Time [Unix Time] 1431583171
End Time [Unix Time] 1431583401
Locations blade c11-8c1s1, blade c14-10c0s3, smw1,
blade c9-8c1s3, blade c14-3c0s1, blade -
c13-6c2s0, blade c19-0c2s3, blade c1-9c2s5,
blade c12-7c0s4, blade c16-1c2s7, asic c11-
8c1s1g0, blade c21-0c0s4
First Tag CORRUPT ROUTING TABLES
End Tag LINK RECOVERY SUCCESS
Tag Counts ROUTING TABLE CORRUPTION [1],
ASIC FAILED [1], CABINET READDED
[6912], ROUTE COMPUTE [1], NET-
WORK QUIESCE [1], NETWORK UNQUI-
ESCE [1], FINISHED LINK RECOVERY
[1], LINK FAILOVER SUCCESS [1],
Total Events 6919
Duration [Seconds] 230
Recovery Status SUCCESS
Additional Info RECOVERY HANDLING TIME= 120:09
Table 5.5 provides an example output of coalescing. This example shows
a successful link failover operation, as indicated by Recovery Status. The
problem starts with the corruption of routing tables in one of the ASICs as
indicated First Tag. This results in failure of links, and hence, triggering of
the failover. The End Tag indicates the unquiesce of the node. Although
the failover ran for 120.09 seconds (indicated by Additional Info), the time,
from the beginning of the rst event to the last event, in the cluster was 230
seconds. When the < Location > tag contains smw1 in the output, it means
that the whole system is aected. In particular, the time between quiescence
to unquiescence stops the trac in the whole system.
5.4.3 System Impact Analyzer
The System impact analyzer processes SWO failure reports led by the tech-
nical sta of Blue Waters/Cray, and correlates them with recovery-sequence
clusters obtained from Gemini aware coalescing step. This operation looks
at the overlapping time between recovery-sequence clusters and SWO dura-
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tion mentioned in the reports. This merging does not necessarily indicate
causation. For causality inference, we manually veried the merged output.
This was a feasible task due to the small number of SWOs (approximately
 101 in this study) that needed to be analyzed manually.
5.4.4 Job Impact Analyzer
The Job impact analyzer evaluates the impact of successful and failed re-
covery procedures on applications. It nds applications -from the database
of consolidated workload- that overlap in time and location with any of the
recovery-sequence clusters. The nal output of this operation is a statistical
characterization of aected applications. It provides the number of appli-
cations running during the time window of the recovery-sequence clusters
and applications terminated during this time window; further, it extracts
the number of applications terminated with success, and the number of ap-
plications terminated with failing status, both system-wide and on the nodes
involved in the recovery operations.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
This section shows our preliminary results from the analysis of the outputs
obtained from the methodology and tools, as described in section 5. We
discuss completion status and failure rates of recovery procedures, and their
impact on the system and applications.
6.1 Measuring Occurrence and Success of Recovery
Procedures
In this section, we measure the following |
 Completion status
 Failure Rate
 Mean-node hours between recovery
6.1.1 Completion Status of Recovery Procedures
Figure 6.1 shows the breakdown in the percentage of successful lane recovery,
link failover, and warm swap procedures. The Gemini interconnect is highly
resilient to lane failures. Specically, 99.1% of lane failures are successfully
recovered. Moreover, the impact of lane recovery failures is very limited since
a disabled lane does not cause link failure, as explained in section 3.1.4 (ex-
cept for three lanes down). Since lane recovery operations are managed by
the L0, they may potentially interfere with other recovery procedures man-
aged by the SMW through the L0, such as link failovers and warm swaps. For
example, after analyzing recovery-sequence cluster summaries generated by
our tool, we found out that in one case, the failure of the lane recovery nega-
tively aected a link failover procedure running in the system. This resulted
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in an interconnect network deadlock that led to congestion and ultimately
system-wide outage. There are other cases where such synchronization issues
lead to failure of Gemini recovery procedures.
99.1%
75.8%
92.1%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Lane Link Warm Swap
Figure 6.1: Recovery completion status for lane, link, and warm swap.
Link failovers are successful only in 75.8% of the cases. Although warm-
swap operations are highly controlled (since they are triggered by system
administrators), around 7.9% of warm swaps fail. Apart from maintenance
reasons, warm swaps are initiated when the network becomes unrouteable.
By analyzing recovery-procedure clusters, we observe that most failures in
the link failovers and warm swaps are caused by other simultaneous failures
in the system. These simultaneous failures could not be managed by the
SMW and, in the end, resulted in a SWO.
6.1.2 Recovery Procedure Failure Rate
Figure 6.2 shows the total count of failures of recovery procedures per month
in Blue Waters for (a) lane, (b) link, and (c) warm swap. Failures of recovery
procedures have decreased over time.
There is a sharp decrease in failures of recovery procedures after November
1, 2013. On that day, Blue Waters SMW software was updated and further
patched (a day later) to x major software bugs related to handling failures in
the Gemini interconnect. Beyond this point, the recovery procedures failure
had been continuously decreasing over time, thus showing the increase in
stability of the system.
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Figure 6.2: Count of total failure of recovery procedures for (a) lane (b)
link (c) warm swap per month. The vertical line shows a major software
upgrade xing bugs in the Gemini interconnect resiliency management code.
6.1.3 Mean Node-Hours Between Recovery Procedures
Next, we calculated mean node-hours between recovery procedures (MNBR)
to understand the frequency of recovery operations with respect to scale.
In this study, we dene two metrics: (1) mean-node hours between launched
recovery operations, i.e., X is launched recovery operations of type Y, and (2)
mean-node hours between failed recovery operations (i.e., X is failed recovery
operations of type Y). Y can be lane recovery, link failover, and warm swap.
Recovery Procedure
Name
Failed Recoveries [h] Launched Recover-
ies [h]
Lane Recovery 133,968.5 1223.2
Link Failover 4,019,056.3 973,167.7
Warm Swap 7,033,348.5 533,608.8
Table 6.1: Mean Node-Hour Between Recovery Events
Table 6.1 summarizes the MNBR for lanes, links, and warm swaps for
failed recovery procedures and the total number of launched recovery proce-
dures. Lane recovery, link recovery, and warm-swap procedures are launched
every 2.8 minutes, 36.2 hours, and 20.6 hours, respectively. Given the high
probability of failure of recovery procedures, a low mean-time be-
tween trigger of recovery procedures poses a signicant threat to
system availability and reliability. Our results show that mean time
between recovery events of interconnect is signicantly lower than
the other components present in the system. For example, Martino
et. al. reported an MTBF of 6.7 hours for the nodes in the same system.
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6.2 Analyzing impact of recovery procedures
In this section, we analyzed the impact of a recovery procedure for successful
and failed recovery procedures on system and applications. System impact is
quantied by counting system-wide outages that were caused by interconnect
recovery procedures.
6.2.1 System-Wide Outages
Of 101 SWOs observed in human-written reports led by NCSA Blue Wa-
ters sta, the system-impact analyzer (see Figure 5.2) identied 28 SWOs
related to Gemini interconnect recovery procedures. Of these 28 cases, 14 of
these are strictly due to the failure of the recovery procedures in the Gemini
interconnect. A deeper analysis of the recovery-sequence clusters associated
with interconnect-related SWOs shows that only one instance of recovery-
procedure failed due to unrouteable topology conguration. a signicant
number of system-wide outages are caused by the failure of inter-
connect recovery procedures. Hence, failure of recovery procedures
decreases the overall MTBF of the system.
6.2.2 Application Impact
Using the methodology in chapter 5, we have analyzed the impact of intercon-
nect related recovery procedures on running applications. The impact was
assessed in terms of percentage of applications that failed during the recovery-
sequence clusters. We calculated this metric for the 28 SWOs and found that
20.13% of the applications failed during these SWOs. Additionally, we found
that 0.20% of the applications failed during successful recoveries. This shows
that successful recovery can also lead to the failure of applications due to the
delay in handling the failures. A successful recovery can last anywhere be-
tween 60 to 1000 of seconds depending on failure type and invoked recovery
procedure.
In Figure 6.3, we show an example of a link failover sequence that ended
successfully but lead to the failure of two applications. Through this example,
we describe the all the potential phases due to which the applications can
fail. A fault (Routing Table Corruption) occurred at time T . A short time
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ASIC 
failed
Routing Table
Corruption
Begin Link
Failover
Rerouting
required
Rerouting 
success
Link Failover 
Success
T + 82 T +127T = 1431583171 T + 132
Unquiesce
Network
Quiesce
Network
Figure 6.3: An example of a successful link failover sequence (taken from
the output of the coalescing algorithm). Orange circle represents faults, red
circle represents failures, and green circles represents recovery operations.
later, the failure (ASIC Failed) occurred, and the failover operation (Begin
Link Failover) was triggered. The failover procedure determined the need
for calculating new routes to handle this failure (Rerouting required), and
calculated new routes to be installed on the routers. Finally, at time T + 82
seconds, the network was quiesced, and the routes were installed. Once
the new routes were installed and asserted, the network operation was fully
restored. In this scenario, in the time interval from T to T +82 seconds, the
network was still active (quiesce had not yet begun), and hence, there was
a chance (in this 82 seconds) for the failure to propagate across the system,
and amplify the impact of the initial fault (the Routing Table Corruption)
on the system and applications. At T + 82 seconds, network was quiesced
to install the calculated routes. However, quiescence does not guarantee
protection from application failures and hence, the application can fail due
to - (1) lag in the propagation of quiescence in the network, and (2) packet
loss. From T + 127 seconds to T + 132 seconds, applications that do not
employ workload redistribution, or checkpointing could potentially fail due
to unavailability of the nodes, blades, or cabinets. In this particular example,
the two applications failed between T to T +82. This example concretely
shows that the failure containment by recovery procedures does not
always hold in practice. Hence, applications can fail even during a
successful recovery for dierent reasons, as discussed above.
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6.2.3 Validation on Mutrino Dataset
The methodology and tools presented in this thesis, work out of the box for
Cray Aries interconnect. We ran I-RAT on `Mutrino dataset '[31] for testing
and validating our models. Mutrino is a Cray XC40 based testbed system
consisting of 100 nodes connected through Aries interconnect for testing the
readiness of applications on Trinity Supercomputer. The dataset consists
of 100 days of logs. We were able to extract and report the Aries errors
from this dataset. Thus, our approach to analyze failure data from
a supercomputer interconnect can be suitably extended to other
interconnect technologies for studying and characterizing intercon-
nect recovery capabilities of the system.
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CHAPTER 7
RELATED WORK
There are several studies on analyzing the behavior and resiliency of large-
scale systems such as [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. These studies have focused on
overall system behavior and system resilience for understanding failure causes
and predicting failures from logs. [39, 40, 41, 42], etc. focused on one of the
HPC components such as le system, interconnect, compute hardware, etc.
However, there is no study detailing the failure of the recovery mechanisms in
HPC systems. This is the rst work that describes the failure of interconnect-
recovery mechanisms in large-scale HPC system such as Blue Waters.
Most of the work in interconnect system focuses on the design and scal-
ability of the networks such as in [43, 44, 45, 19, 2]. With respect to re-
siliency, the scientic community has focused on failures and recovery of
data-transmission [46], network-links [47, 48] and network-devices [49, 50].
The MIT Reliable Router [49] describes techniques for link monitoring, link-
level retry, link shutdown and fault-masking techniques. Error control codes
for data transmission is given [46]. Adaptive routing algorithms are useful for
routing around faulty links (fail-stop model) and is rst described in [48]. In
[41], Ezell presents micro-benchmarks to diagnose problems in HPC systems
with the Gemini interconnect, using performance registers. That analysis is
performed in unloaded network scenarios. In contrast to existing literature
on interconnect-resiliency, we describe an abstract recovery model to under-
stand the causes for the failure of the recovery mechanisms in interconnection
networks. In this work, we primarily proposed the model and then measured
the impact of failures of recovery-mechanisms on system and applications.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we presented a study to understand the Gemini intercon-
nect recovery operations. Based on this understanding, we proposed and
implemented I-RAT as a plugin on top of LogDiver, a tool to extract and
reconstruct recovery sequences to measure system and application resiliency
to interconnect recovery operations.
Through our detailed analysis, we showed that the failure of interconnect
recovery procedures in a large-scale system posses a real threat to availability
and reliability of the overall system. We further analyzed the impact of
interconnect-failures on system and applications. Out of 101 SWOs, 28 were
shown to be caused by interconnect-related. As many as  20% of the
executing applications fail during the recovery procedures. We also show
that the applications can fail even during a successful recovery.
We found only one instance of unroutable topology conguration, however
as many 28 SWO's were due to interconnect-related failures. This calls for
revisiting recovery models and mechanisms for HPC interconnects.
8.1 Future Directions
In the future, we plan to take steps to delve deeper into understanding the
cause of the failure of the recovery procedures and have an elaborate dis-
cussion on the need for building abstract recovery models for interconnects.
We also plan to implement and validate our abstract models through fault
injection experiments.
We also plan to compare the performance and resiliency of the Gemini and
Aries interconnect in two large-scale systems using the developed method-
ologies.
The goal of this thesis is to enable data-driven resiliency mechanisms. Our
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work provides a strong foundation to understand and build data-driven ap-
proaches for building monitoring and resiliency mechanisms for future large-
scale systems.
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APPENDIX A
INTERCONNECT RELATED EVENTS
Table A.1 contains a list of all the rules used to lter the raw systems logs
obtained from Blue Waters. The table contains three columns { (1) template
ID (unique numerical identier used internally by the tools), (2) regex rules
containing regular expressions, and (3) tag (uniquely identifying the error).
Table A.1: Regular expressions used for ltering Gemini failure/recovery
related events.
Template
ID
Regex Rule Tag
1 ERRORns*powerSlotDown: blade emergency -
power o
5 Responsens*Protocolns*Error protocol error
12 ERROR:ns*Routingns*fault routing failure
133 ERRORns*nw+:ns*
cabns*healthns*faultns*detected.
cabinet degraded -
health
142 ns*tablens*fullns*droppingns*packet. packet drop on -
buer overow
165 SSIDns*Detectedns*Misroutedns*Packet misrouted packet
103 SSIDns*Correctablens*Memoryns*Error ecc error
104 ipogif rx irq:Received
ns*packetns*checksumns*error
checksum error
180 ERROR:ns*route ns*commandns*
forns*partition.*timedns*out
routing timeout
238 Geminins*Error:ns*lostns*
nd+ns*messages?ns*duens*tons*full
message lost on -
buer overow
2001 HSNnsASICnsLCBnslane.*nsreinitnsfailed lane recovery failed
2002 TXnslanemask=[356]+ one lane down
2003 TXnslanemask=[124]+ two lane down
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Table A.1: (cont.)
Template
ID
Regex Rule Tag
2004 TXnslanemask=0 three lane down
2005 cb hw error: failed compo-
nentns.*nstypens23
link failed
2006 cb hw error:nsfailed compo-
nentns.*nstypens21
asic failed
2007 alertn|MezzaninensVoltagensFault mezzanine power -
failed
2008 generic rsp timeout:nsERROR.*L0 blade power failed
2009 dispatch:nscurrent state warm swap warm swap started
2010 bwsmw1ns[nd]+nsWarmns
swapnsoperationnswasnssuccessful
warm swap success
2011 WARNING:nsTimednsoutns wait-
ingnsfornsreplyns tonsSDBnsupdatens
eventnsfromnsbootns node
warm swap delayed
2012 routingnstablenscorruptionnsfound routing table corrup-
tion
2013 ;ns*reroutensrequired routing reroute trig-
gerred
2014 Allnscomponentsnsreturnednssucces reroute success
2015 do throttle:nsTellingnsallnsbladesns
tonsunthrottlensnetworknsbandwidth
throttle sys
2016 do node quiesce stop network trac
2017 do node unquiesce start networ trac
2018 cb hw error:nshandlingnsfailednslink started link recovery
2019 donenshandlingnsfailednslinksns
inns[nd+.nd+]*nsseconds
nished link recovery
2020 bwsmw1ns[nd]+nsLinkns recov-
erynsoperationnswas successful
link recovery success
2021 ALERT:nsEmergencynsPowernsOnsFault. epo fault
2022 ALERT:nsFannsRPMnsFault fan fault
2023 donenshandlingnswarmnsswapnsin warm swap nish time
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Table A.1: (cont.)
Template
ID
Regex Rule Tag
2024 setn warmn swapn err set warm swap err
2025 do throttle:nsTellingnsallnsblades
nstonsnthrottle nsGemini
do network throttle
2026 (ndnd:ndnd:ndnd).*(handlingns cor-
ruptednsroutingnstablenserror)
handling corrupt rout-
ing table
2027 HSNnsBootnsfailed hsn node boot failed
2028 dispatch.*(current statensquiescens) network quisce
2029 dispatch.*(current statensunquiesce) network unquisce
2030 (ndnd:ndnd:ndnd).*ns(cnd+-
nd+cnd+snd+).*nsauto-throttled
blade throttled
2031 Linknsrecoverynsoperationnsfailed link recovery failed
2032 Warmnsswapnsoperationnsfailed warm swap failed
2033 HWERR.*0x0(00([1-9]|a)|30[1-
4]|4(0e|0f|10|11)|50([1-
9]|a|b|c)|60[1-3]|70([1-
8]|c|d)|80(6|7|c|d|e|f)|81[0-
5]|90[1-6]|b(0|2)4|b3([3-
8]|a)|c0[1-6]|d0(6|c|d|e|f))
asic logic failure
2034 HWERR.*(BTEnsnwXnsDescriptorns Ta-
blensIndexnsndnsSBE):Info
bte error
2036 L0 T BAX NODE0 VRM VDD:nsnd+ l0 vdd error
2037 send slot down rsp:nsbladefailedlist blade down detected
2038 dispatch:nscurrent state route compute route compute
2039 Retrynsndns-
nsroutingnswithns[XYZ]+nsroutingnsorder
routing retry
2040 ERROR:nsroutenscommandnsforns parti-
tionnsp0nstimednsout
routing timeout
2041 add link to list:nsaddingnslink link failed handled
2042 l0sys healthmon:nsL0SYS HEALTH-
MONnsfailed
blade electrical issue
2043 Warmnsswapnsbeginning warm swap begin
52
Table A.1: (cont.)
Template
ID
Regex Rule Tag
2044 Attemptingnstonsaddnsblades warm swap transition
2045 AppendingnsL0nscnd+-
nd+cndsndnsstatensready
cabinet readded
2046 build modulelist:nssettingnsbladenscnd+-
nd+cndsndnstonsdisablednsmodulenslist
blade recovery gemini
2047 Clearingnsbladenswarnings blade recovery success
2048 Clearingnsbladensalerts blade recovery
2049 Installingnsnewnsroutes rerouting
2050 Linksnsthatnswillnsbens un-
usednsarensnowns turnednso
disable links
2051 Finishednsinstallingnsnewnsroutes reroute complete
2052 Unquiescingnsthenshighn-speednsnetwork hsn network uniquisce
2053 Computingnsnewnsroutes reroute compute
2054 Waitingnsfornsthenshigh-
speednsnetworknstracnstonsdrain
hsn wait network -
drain
2055 Finishednsquiescingnsthenshigh-
speednsnetwork
hsn network quisced
2056 Testnsreroutensproceeding test reroute
2057 Turningnslinknsmonitoringns
onnsfornsbladesnsthatnswerensadded
warmswap blade on
2058 FinishednsupdatingnsSDBnsdatabase sdb update success
2059 cb node unavailable:nsnodenscnd+-
nd+cndsndnndnsfoundns
innsunavailablensevent
node down
2060 cb node available:nsfoundnsnodenscnd+-
nd+cndsndnnd
node up
2061 CabinetnsReceivednsUnexpectedns
BladensControllernsHeartbeat
cabinet heartbeat -
failed
2062 LinknsInactive link inactive
2063 HWERR.*0x0801 hwerr misroute packet
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Table A.1: (cont.)
Template
ID
Regex Rule Tag
2064 HWERR.*0x0802 hwerr request with -
no entry orb
2065 HWERR.*0x0803 hwerr command mis-
match
2066 HWERR.*0x0816 hwerr dword it mis-
match
2067 HWERR.*0x0b2b hwerr b2b
2068 handlingnslack nsofnsforward
nsprogressnserrorns.*for ns nodens(cnd+-
nd+c nd+s nd+n nd+)
lack of forward -
progress
2069 set warm swap err warm swap err info
2071 HWERR.*0x0b2e hwerr ssid response -
protocol error
2080 HWERR.*0x0d08 hwerr nif bad req -
packet
2081 HWERR.*0x0d09 hwerr nif bad re-
sponse packet hsn -
bug 1
2088 HWERR.*0x0814 hwerr ow ctl orb to -
nl hsn bug 2
2094 HWERR.*0x0(401|b15|b1d|b30|b2d) hwerr ssid
2095 HWERR.*0x0d0(4|5) hwerr nif squashed req
2142 HWERR.*0x080d illegal r ag
2143 HWERR.*0x080e illegal pid ag
2144 HWERR.*0x080f illegal pt ag
2150 HWERR.*0x0815 orb tail on head ag
2154 HWERR.*0x0904 overow it vc1
2158 HWERR.*0x0b24 resp malformedpacket
2172 HWERR.*0x0d06 buer overow
2173 HWERR.*0x0d0c nic0 req bubble
2186 HWERR.*0x0403 malformed
54
Table A.1: (cont.)
Template
ID
Regex Rule Tag
2187 HWERR.*0x0404 npes err
2188 HWERR.*0x0405 already ssid alloc
2189 HWERR.*0x040c ht bad nonposted re-
quest
2194 HWERR.*0x0a03 rx vc desc inv
2195 HWERR.*0x0b05 lreq uncortranserror
2196 HWERR.*0x0b0e lreq npes violation
2197 HWERR.*0x0b11 rreq misroutedpacket
2199 HWERR.*0x0b19 rreq membounderror
2200 HWERR.*0x0b1a rreq writepermission-
error
2207 HWERR.*0x0b39 ssid unexpectedrspssid
2208 dispatch.*nscurrent statensaggregate fail-
uresnsn*n*n*n*n*
link failover agg fail-
ures
2209 dispatch.*nscurrent statenshw er-
ror.*n*n*n*n*
hw err linkf identier
2210 dispatch.*nscurrent statensnish failover nish
2211 CMD:nsn*n*n*n*n*nsalivensn*n*n*n*n* cmd alive
2212 CMD:nsn*n*n*n*n*nsunloadnsn*n*n*n*n* cmd unload
2213 CMD:nsn*n*n*n*n*nsdownloadnsn*n*n*n*n*cmd download
2214 CMD:nsn*n*n*n*n*nsnode -
downnsn*n*n*n*n*
cmd node down
2215 CMD:nsn*n*n*n*n*nsmodule -
downnsn*n*n*n*n*
cmd module down
2216 CMD:nsn*n*n*n*n*nsmodule -
upnsn*n*n*n*n*
cmd module up
2217 CMD:nsn*n*n*n*n*nsnode -
upnsn*n*n*n*n*
cmd node up
2218 CMD:nsn*n*n*n*n*nscoldstartnsn*n*n*n*n* cmd cold start
2219 dispatch:nscurrent statensdown unused -
links
down unsused links
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Table A.1: (cont.)
Template
ID
Regex Rule Tag
2220 dispatch:nscurrent statensinit new links init new links
2221 dispatch:nscurrent statenscheck init new -
blades
init new blades
2222 n*n*n*ERRORn*n*n*nsMMRns
ornsMemorynsReadnsFailed
mmr memory read -
failed
2223 n*n*n*n*n*nsdispatch:nscurrent -
statensinitialnsn*n*n*n*n*
failover initial
2224 TXnslanemask=7 lane recovery success
2225 do throttle:nssendingnsthrottlensmask unthrottle sys
2226 atnstopnsofnscongestionnslistnsfor app kill
2227 add component to node fault list nlink victim node -
added
2228 cb aggregate timeout:nsonlynscriticalns
nodenserrors;nsskippingns alivens steps
nlink id
2229 send node nmi -
req:nsnumbernsofnsnodesnsfailed
nlink node disabling
2230 send node nmi -
req:nssendingnsHALTnsNMInstonsnode
nlink node disabled
2231 nonsreroutensrequired no reroute required
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APPENDIX B
CASE STUDY - LINK FAILOVER
This appendix summarizes the trace of successful and failed link failover
procedures. Successful failover trace is given in Table B.1 and failed failover
trace is given in Table B.2
Table B.1: Trace of a successful link failover from Blue Waters.
Time Action Action Information
2015-11-02
16:51:39
dispatch: current state: aggregate failures
2015-11-02
16:51:49
dispatch: current state: hw error
2015-11-02
16:51:50
dispatch: current state: alive
2015-11-02
16:52:23
dispatch: current state: check alive
2015-11-02
16:52:23
dispatch: current state: interrupt bounce
2015-11-02
16:52:24
dispatch: current state: check interrupt bounce
2015-11-02
16:52:24
dispatch: current state: alive2
2015-11-02
16:52:40
dispatch: current state: check alive2
2015-11-02
16:52:40
dispatch: current state: set alerts
2015-11-02
16:52:47
dispatch: current state: route compute
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Table B.1: (cont.)
Time Action Action Information
2015-11-02
16:52:47
Executing Com-
mand
/opt/cray/hss/default/bin/rtr -S
2015-11-02
16:54:41
dispatch: current state: check route compute
2015-11-02
16:54:41
dispatch: current state: quiesce
2015-11-02
16:54:48
dispatch: current state: check quiesce
2015-11-02
16:54:48
dispatch: current state: quiesce drain
2015-11-02
16:54:52
dispatch: current state: switch netwatch
2015-11-02
16:54:56
dispatch: current state: check switch netwatch
2015-11-02
16:54:56
dispatch: current state: down unused links
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: get class
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: get nids
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: gather partition info
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: check partition info
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: gather user components
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: gather partition components
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: cross check
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: interrupt sysd
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Table B.1: (cont.)
Time Action Action Information
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: alive
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: gather mezz up
2015-11-02
16:55:32
CMD: link down unused
2015-11-02
16:55:33
dispatch: current state: check down unused -
links
2015-11-02
16:55:33
dispatch: current state: down drain
2015-11-02
16:55:36
dispatch: current state: route install
2015-11-02
16:55:36
Executing Com-
mand
/opt/cray/hss/default/bin/rtr -P
2015-11-02
16:55:42
dispatch: current state: check route install
2015-11-02
16:55:42
dispatch: current state: unquiesce
2015-11-02
16:55:49
dispatch: current state: check unquiesce
2015-11-02
16:55:49
dispatch: current state: nish
2015-11-02
16:55:49
switch warm-
swap led:
switching warmswap LED blink for
blade C9-7c2s1
2015-11-02
16:55:50
set warm swap -
err:
appending warm swap text: Link re-
covery operation was successful
Table B.2: Trace of a failed link failover from Blue Waters.
Time Action Action Information
2014-11-
08T02:21:50
INFO: c20-8c0s7g0l52 ***ERROR*** HSN
ASIC LCB lanes(s) reinit failed
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Table B.2: (cont.)
Time Action Action Information
2014-11-
08T12:52:41
dispatch: current state: aggregated failures
2014-11-08
12:52:51
dispatch: current state: hw err
2014-11-08
12:53:28
dispatch: current state: nish
2014-11-08
12:53:28
INFO: handling: failed links in 37.76 seconds
2014-11-08
12:53:28
***ERROR***: recovery operation failed; error 5
2014-11-08
12:53:28
dispatch: initial
2014-11-08
12:53:28
dispatch: aggregate failures
2014-11-08
12:53:39
dispatch: hw error
2014-11-08
12:54:09
dispatch: nish
2014-11-08
12:54:09
INFO: handling failed links in 30.19 seconds
2014-11-08
12:54:09
***ERROR***: recovery operation failed; error 5
2014-11-08
12:54:09
dispatch: current state: initial
2014-11-08
12:54:09
dispatch: current state: aggregated failures
2014-11-08
12:54:19
dispatch: current state: hw err
2014-11-08
12:54:49
dispatch: current state: nish
2014-11-08
12:54:49
INFO: handling failed links in 30.04 seconds
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Table B.2: (cont.)
Time Action Action Information
2014-11-08
12:54:49
***ERROR***: recovery operation failed; error 5
2014-11-
08T12:54:49
dispatch: current state: initial
2014-11-08
12:54:49
dispatch: current state: aggregated failures
2014-11-08
12:54:59
dispatch: current state: hw err
2014-11-08
12:55:17
dispatch: current state: alive
2014-11-08
12:55:50
dispatch: current state: check alive
2014-11-08
12:55:51
dispatch: current state: alive2
2014-11-08
12:55:54
dispatch: current state: check alive2
2014-11-08
12:55:54
dispatch: current state: set alerts
2014-11-08
12:55:54
dispatch: current state: nish
2014-11-08
12:55:54
INFO: handling failed links in 54.5 seconds
2014-11-08
12:55:54
***ERROR***: recovery operation failed; error 11
2014-11-08
12:55:54
dispatch: current state: initial
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